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ABSTRACT
THE HINDSIGHT BIAS: JUDGMENT TASK DIFFERENTIATION
Ross William May
Old Dominion University, 2012
Director: Dr. Ivan K. Ash

Recent hindsight bias research suggests that modern Cognitive Reconstruction
theories that model hindsight effects as non-unitary phenomena potentially confound
their findings by not differentiating between judgment tasks. This experiment tests a nonunitary approach of modeling hindsight effects that predicts confidence ratings and
outcome likelihood judgments to be independent tasks, governed by differing cognitive
processes and susceptible to unique patterns of hindsight bias. Predictions specify that
sense-making theories accurately account for hindsight bias effects for outcome
likelihood ratings and expectation based adjustment models accurately account for "I
would have known that!" hindsight bias effects for confidence ratings. Utilizing a withinsubjects, narrative text paradigm, the proposed non-unitary approach was tested by
investigating whether the effects of outcome congruency on hindsight bias results were
moderated by the type of judgment task. Participants read stories, rated their confidence
in predicting the outcome or the likelihood of possible outcomes, given either expected or
unexpected story outcomes, and then asked to recall their ratings. Results supported the
predictions of the proposed non-unitary approach with confidence ratings and outcome
likelihood judgments producing opposite patterns of hindsight bias effects. Theoretical
implications, study limitations and future research directions were also discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In one of the earliest hindsight bias investigations, Fischhoff and Beyth (1975)
had participants attempt to recall the beliefs they held in the past before receiving
outcome feedback. First, participants judged the probability of different outcomes of
Nixon's then upcoming political trips to Moscow and Peking. Then after the trips, the
participants were told the political outcomes of the trips and were asked to recall the
probabilities they had earlier assigned to the outcomes. Results revealed that remembered
probabilities were biased in favor of the actual outcomes. In other words participants
"remembered" having given higher probabilities to events that actually occurred and
lower probabilities to events that did not occur, hence the "hindsight bias".
In the last 30 years, the "hindsight bias" has become one of the most frequently
cited judgment biases. The bias began receiving attention when Fischhoff (1975)
published his seminal hindsight paper and research has since lead to two meta-analytic
reviews (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway &
Posavac, 2004), five substantive theoretical reviews (Blank, Nestler, von Collani &
Fischer, 2008; Erdfelder & Buchner, 1998; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoflrage & Pohl,
2003; Stahlberg & Maass, 1998) and two journal special issues (Memory, 2003; Social
Cognition, 2007), revealing the bias to be robust across a wide variety of situations,
domains, and task environments and influencing processes involved in learning, memory
storage, memory retrieval, and judgment formation (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990).
Furthermore, the appearance of this bias in many "real life" situations, such as stock
purchases, jurors' decisions and medical diagnoses indicates that research into this
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phenomenon has several practical implications (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham,
1991). Due to the ubiquity and real-world occurrence of this bias, the goal of proposing
and evaluating theoretical explanations for the hindsight bias phenomenon is important
for both scientific and applied purposes.
To date, Cognitive Reconstruction (CR) theories have provided the most plausible
explanation of the hindsight bias (Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault,
Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990, Stahlberg & Maass,
1998). CR theories claim that individuals do not directly access a memory of their
predictive judgments when making retrospective judgments. Instead, individuals either
rejudge the current situation or estimate the initial decision in an attempt to reconstruct
the initial judgment. Therefore, CR theories propose that the exposure to outcome
information influences the reconstruction process and leads the person to overestimate
their predictive accuracy. In this context, the hindsight bias can be defined as the
descriptive account of the systematic difference between people's predictive and
retrospective judgments (Ash, 2009).
However, specific methodological concerns and empirical inconsistencies in the
hindsight literature have lead to questions of the adequacy of CR theories to thoroughly
and accuracy model the hindsight bias. First, in attempting to explain the specific nature
of the cognitive mechanism(s) responsible for eliciting hindsight, the literature reveals a
host of competing CR theories that propose different types of judgment reconstruction
mechanisms (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Second, research attempting to "de-bias" the
hindsight bias based on these CR theories have lead to inconsistent results (Guilbault et
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al., 2004). Lastly, the research attempting to predict individual differences based on these
CR theories has been largely unsuccessful (Musch & Wagner, 2007).
These issues have raised fundamental questions concerning the cognitive
mechanisms involved in retrospective judgment making and if the hindsight bias is a
unitary phenomenon (Ash, 2009; Blank, Nestler, von Collani, & Fischer, 2008). It has
been proposed that some of the opposing hindsight predictions made by different CR
theories and many of the conflicting results in the literature may be a symptom of
researchers foiling to separate judgment tasks according to the unique cognitive processes
specific to each judgment task (Ash, 2009; Ash & Wiley, 2008). The current study
investigated whether the different judgment tasks predominantly used in contemporary
hindsight bias research trigger different cognitive mechanisms within the judgment
formation process. Specifically, the study examined whether judgments of the likelihood
of possible outcomes to situations and metacognitive assessments of confidence in the
predictions rely on different cues and mental representations which lead to the activation
of different judgment formation processes. Due to these task and processing differences,
the theories required to explain the pattern of hindsight bias must be unique to each
judgment task.
The goal of the current investigation is to provide support of a new approach in
modeling hindsight effects that is designed to eliminate confounded hindsight findings
due to the lack of judgment task differentiation. In the following sections, I first introduce
CR theories of the hindsight bias and discuss unitary and non-unitary hindsight bias
models. Then I discuss the differences between the two types of judgment tasks that are
commonly used in hindsight bias research and the implications of modeling hindsight
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findings for these different tasks in accordance with unitary and non-unitary models. This
is followed by a discussion of how outcome congruency manipulations can be used to test
different unitary and non-unitary theories of the hindsight bias. Finally, I report findings
of an experiment that tested differential unitary and non-unitary model predictions of
hindsight bias patterns. Using a scenario based, within-subjects hindsight bias paradigm,
the experiment tested whether the effects of outcome congruency on hindsight bias
patterns were moderated by judgment task. Support is found for non-unitary models with
findings providing evidence for modeling hindsight effects separately for each judgment
task.

Unitary Cognitive Reconstruction Theories
Cognitive reconstruction (CR) theories of the hindsight bias generally propose
that exposure to outcome information biases retrospective judgment making toward the
given outcome. Therefore, when trying to recreate their initial predictive judgment,
individuals tend to overestimate their predictive accuracy thus creating the hindsight bias.
Several CR models have been developed that propose differing cognitive processes to
explain exactly how people reconstruct their prior judgments. In categorizing similarities
between these models, Hawkins and Hastie (1990) differentiated between two general
classes of CR theories that utilize different reconstructive processes to explain hindsight
effects: the Anchoring and Adjustment theories and the Updating and Rejudging theories.
Anchoring and Adjustment theories propose that people attempt to reconstruct
their predictive judgment by using outcome information as an anchor and then adjust
their retrospective estimate from the given outcome by using some metacognitive or
experiential cue. (Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir &
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Mazursky, 1990; Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991; Schwarz &
Stahlberg, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Werth & Strack, 2003; Werth, Strack, &
Forster, 2002). Hindsight effects occur because people, when trying to make plausible
estimates, are generally overly optimistic in their predictive abilities and therefore make
insufficient adjustments during retrospection. Thus, hindsight effects result from people's
inability to appropriately utilize subjective cues in reconstructing predictive judgments.
Updating and Rejudging theories propose that exposure to outcome information
affects people's representation and mental model of the situation, which leads to a new
and updated representation. Individuals then make their retrospective judgments by
rejudging the situation using their current mental representation. However, since this
representation has been affected by outcome information, people's retrospective
judgments tend to be biased in favor of the given outcome (Ash, 2009; Blank & Nestler,
2007; Nestler, Blank, & von Collani, 2008a, 2008b; Carli, 1999; Fischhoff, 1975; Hasher,
Attig, & Alba, 1981; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000;
Pohl, Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003; Pezzo, 2003; Pezzo & Pezzo, 2007; Roese & Olson,
1996; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991).
Ash (2009) then further specified two unique types of reconstruction processes
that have been proposed within each general CR class. Within the Anchoring and
Adjustment theories two different adjustment mechanism were proposed; the
expectation-based adjustment mechanism and the experience-based adjustment
mechanism. Likewise, two different updating mechanisms were proposed within the
Updating and Rejudging theories: the automatic assimilation mechanism and the sensemaking mechanism.
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Theories proposing an expectation-based adjustment mechanism propose that
people attempt to use "surprise" as a cue in evaluating how different the outcome
information is from whatever they previously knew about the event and the judgment
(Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990; Sanna & Schwarz, 2007). By using
the cue of how "surprising" they found the given outcome, people adjust their
retrospective judgment using this subjective information. For example, if a person recalls
that the outcome was expected then it will lead to an "I would have known that" feeling.
This feeling will cause the person to make only a small adjustment from the 100%
likelihood anchor, which often leads to an overestimation of predictive accuracy
(hindsight bias). However, if a person feels that the outcome was surprising then it will
lead to an "I would have never known that" feeling. This subjective feeling will cause a
larger adjustment and lead to retrospective judgments that do not as greatly overestimate
predictive accuracy, thereby lessening the hindsight bias effect. Furthermore, in situations
that are highly surprising the adjustment may even lead to an underestimation of
predictive accuracy and cause a "reverse" hindsight bias effect.
Theories advancing an experience-based adjustment mechanism propose that
people generally do not remember or recall their original judgment and, at retrospection,
use outcome information as an anchor in reconstructing their original judgment.
Adjustment from this anchor when producing a retrospective judgment is based upon
experiential beliefs. The magnitude and direction of the hindsight effect then depends on
people's subjective assumption about their confidence in their predictive ability or beliefs
about their expertise in the judgment domain (Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003; Werth &
Strack, 2003; Werth, Strack, & Forster, 2002). These theories propose that people are
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generally overly optimistic about their knowledge in a judgment domain or overly
confident in their predictive accuracy and therefore endorse that their prior estimate was
closer to the given outcome than their original estimation actually indicated (producing a
hindsight bias). However, if people felt that the outcome was unpredictable or lacked
knowledge about the judgment domain, then a larger adjustment would be made thus
reducing, reversing, or eliminating the hindsight bias.
Automatic assimilation theories propose that people use the same type of
judgment process to make both the predictive and the retrospective judgments (Carli,
1999; FischhofF, 1975; Hasher, Attig, & Alba, 1981; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage
et al., 2000; Pohl et al., 2003). Generally, it is proposed that people make predictive
judgments based on the amount of outcome supporting information accessible in their
mental representation of the situation. Outcomes that have more accessible supporting
information are judged as more likely, while outcomes that have less accessible
supporting information are judged as less likely. During retrospection, people simply
rejudge the situation using the same process used to formulate their predictive judgment.
However, at retrospection, outcome information has been assimilated or integrated into
their representation of the situation. This assimilation process renders the outcomesupporting information more accessible in memory. Therefore, when making
retrospective judgments, people are rejudging the likelihood of the potential outcomes
using an updated mental representation that fevors the given outcome.
Sense-making theories propose a "sense-making" or a "causal reasoning" process
responsible for producing hindsight effects (Ash, 2009; Blank & Nestler, 2007; Nestler,
Blank, & von Collani, 2008a, 2008b; Pezzo, 2003; Pezzo & Beckstead, 2008; Pezzo &

8

Pezzo, 2007; Roese & Olson, 1996; Schkade & Kilbourne, 1991). Sense-making has been
conceptualized as a set of motivated problem-solving cognitions that occur during the
comprehension, interpretation, solution, and explanation of an event (Anderson, Krull, &
Weiner, 1996). The process of "sense-making" then is the search for potential
explanations, or causes, that suitably support the occurrence of a particular outcome. In
general, these theories postulate that people will only update their knowledge or beliefs
when their current representation of the situation is incongruent with the given outcome.
These theories propose that incongruent outcome information activates "sense-making"
mechanisms. Successful sense-making will lead to an updated representation of the
situation that is more in line with the outcome information. This updating of the problem
representation occurs only in situations where the given outcome information does not fit
coherently, and thus does not make sense, with the pre-outcome information. Greater
hindsight bias effects are then produced following incongruent outcomes in contrast to
more congruent outcomes. Two research camps have produced comprehensive sensemaking models, Blank and Nestler (2007; Nestler, Blank, & von Collani, 2008a; 2008b)
and Ash (2009).

Non-Unitary Cognitive Reconstruction Theories
In addition to the unitary hindsight CR theories, there is a growing consensus in
the literature that "the hindsight bias" is not a singular phenomenon (see Blank, Nestler,
von Collani, & Fischer, 2008; Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoffrage, 1997; Kelman, Fallas, &
Folger, 1998). In an effort to move the conceptualization of "hindsight bias" away from a
singular and unitary view, these CR theories decompose the "hindsight experience" into
separate and unique sub-phenomena. These multifaceted, non-unitary theories attempt to
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account for the different "hindsight experiences" by breaking down the hindsight bias
into separate experiences, processes, or components. Recent advancements in this nonunitary view of hindsight bias have been made by Pezzo and Pezzo's (2007) Motivated
Sense-Making Model, Mttller & Stahlberg's (2007) Dual-Process Model, and Blank,
Nestler, von Collani, and Fischer's (2008) Separate Components View (2008).
According to Pezzo and Pezzo's (2007) Motivated Sense-Making Model,
hindsight bias is the result of two distinct processes: sense-making and defensive
processing. Unexpectedly negative and self-relevant outcomes typically trigger a search
(the sense-making process) for external, but not internal causes for the outcome. This
sense-making process is activated when outcome information is inconsistent with prior
knowledge. Successful sense-making (finding an acceptable external cause for the
outcome) leaves people with an updated representation of the situation that favors the
given outcome. On retrospective judgments, people use this updated representation to
reconstruct their predictive judgment, which leads to the hindsight bias. A failure to
uncover external causes often results in defensive processing.
Defensive processing is activated when judgments are made in a self-relevant
domain (i.e. situations where outcomes have positive or negative impacts on the person
making the judgment). In these domains, negative outcomes will cause people to
discount or ignore the outcome in order to protect their self-esteem In doing so, a more
accurate assessment of their predictive judgment is facilitated, attenuating hindsight bias
effects. However, in some instances, internal causes may be so undeniable that
responsibility is accepted for the negative outcome and the hindsight bias results.
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Blank, Nestler, von Collani, and Fischer's Separate Components View (2008)
argues that within the hindsight bias literature there are three different hindsight bias
experiences that emerge: memory distortion experiences, impressions of foreseeability,
and impressions of necessity. Memory distorting experiences refer to hindsight effects in
which, after having received feedback about the outcome of an event or the answer to a
factual knowledge question, people's recollections of their own prior judgments are
biased in favor of the direction of the feedback. The impression of foreseeability
describes the tendency for people to believe they would have been able to predict, or that
they knew all along, how an event would conclude. Impressions of necessity refer to
hindsight effects where, once the outcome is known, the probably of event outcomes are
perceived as more necessary and inevitable (more probable) in hindsight than in
foresight.
Furthermore, the authors claim that these three different hindsight components
(experiences) are distinguished from each other by differing qualities of four features; the
entities the components refer to (entity), the content or object (content), the psychological
process (process), and the functions they serve the individual (function). Notably, the
authors hold that the each component is driven by a distinct psychological process. They
suggest that causal attribution is the main process underlying necessity impressions,
foreseeability is driven by metacognitive considerations, and memory distortions are
elicited through the memory processes of anchoring on the outcome and reconstructing
one's initial prediction from the anchor.
The Dual-Processes Model of hindsight bias proposed by Mtiller and Stahlberg
(2007) was aimed at addressing some of the contradicting predictions and results
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regarding the role of surprise in hindsight bias effects. This model attributes hindsight
differences as a combination of the activation of sense-making processes and
expectation-based anchoring and adjustment processes. The dual process model suggests
that the subjective feeling of surprise influences hindsight effects through two different
routes. First, it is proposed that surprise can be used as a heuristic cue in the
reconstruction of pre-outcome predictions. In this sense, the feeling of surprise alerts one
to an inaccurate or unpredicted outcome. Secondly, it is proposed that surprise can also
act as a trigger to elicit a biased sense-making process when a certain "surprise" threshold
is reached.
Hindsight effects are then determined by the activation and utilization of these
two processes, which are influenced by both motivational levels and/or cognitive load
capacity. This model posits that in high motivation or low cognitive load situations,
surprising outcomes should be likely to activate resource demanding sense-making
processes. However, in low motivation or high cognitive load situations, simpler and
more automatic surprise-based heuristic adjustment mechanisms would be activated. Due
to these differing reconstruction mechanisms, opposite hindsight bias patterns are
expected to be observed under differing motivational situations or cognitive load
constraints. Specifically, the sense-making processes would lead to hindsight bias only
for surprising or unexpected outcomes, because these are the types of situations which
would activate sense-making. The expectation based anchor and adjust mechanisms
would only lead to hindsight bias on unsurprising or expected outcomes. In these
situations people exhibit the metacognitive "I would have known that!" feeling that leads
to under adjustment from the overconfidence in their predictive judgment ability.
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While these non-unitary models have made contributions to the notion that the
"hindsight bias" phenomena may be caused or determined by multiple cognitive
processes, they have not proposed that differences in judgment tasks may result in
different patterns of hindsight findings. Again, I propose that some of the opposing
predictions and conflicting findings in the literature may be a symptom of researchers
failing to separate judgment choices according to the cognitive processes that are specific
to each judgment task. Next, I discuss the differences between the two types of judgment
tasks that are commonly used in hindsight bias research and the implications of modeling
hindsight findings for these different tasks in accordance with unitary and non-unitary
models.

Judgment Tasks
Two main types of judgment tasks used to investigate the hindsight bias are
situational judgment tasks and metacognitive assessments (Ash & Wiley, 2008;
Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway & Posavac, 2004;
Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Hoffrage & Pohl, 2003; Pohl, 2007). Both of these judgment
tasks are designed to provide laboratory models of frequently occurring real-life
judgments were the occurrence of the hindsight bias may have severe detrimental effects
(Fischhoff, 2007; Louie, Rajon, & Sibley, 2007). As examples of these detrimental
effects, inaccurate retrospective judgment processes have been shown to occur in stock
purchases (Louie, 1999), political decisions (Blank, Nestler, von Collani & Fischer,
2008), juror's decisions (Casper, Benedict, & Perry, 1989), victim degradation (Carli,
1999), as well as healthcare and medical decisions (Arkes, Faust, Guilmette, & Hart,
1988; Bo rum, Otto, & Golding, 1993). By understanding how retrospective judgments

are constructed, better interventions can be developed to help prevent the harmful effects
of the hindsight bias.
Situational judgment tasks commonly assess outcome likelihood predictions.
Outcome likelihood predictions involve asking participants to predict the likelihood of
the outcome of an event or situation. As an example, participants would first be presented
a narrative story or a description of some situation. They then would be asked to predict
the probability of different outcomes to the event or situation. For example, Ash (2009)
presented this question prompt to participants after they read a narrative of a tennis match
between two players: "Either Mark Krause won the match OR Nathan Mitchell won the
match. Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how likely the two outcomes are
based on the story." After this predictive judgment phase, feedback consisting of either
the conclusion to the story or a description of the "true" outcome of the event would be
given to the participants (i.e. Mark Krause won). Hindsight bias on outcome likelihood
judgments is then evidenced by higher retrospective likelihood ratings for the given
outcome.
Metacognition refers to "cognition about cognitive phenomena" (Flavell, 1979).
In hindsight bias paradigms, metacognitive assessments would include any task that asks
people to assess the nature of their own memory, knowledge, skill, abilities, or expertise
(Ash & Wiley, 2008). A primary type of metacognitive judgment that has been used in
hindsight bias research is a confidence rating. Confidence judgments usually use trivia
problems to ask participants to assess the likelihood they are correct after selecting a
response or choosing an answer (e.g. Hoffrage, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000; Which
food do you think has more cholesterol, chocolate fudge cake or pie? How confident are
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you that your choice is correct?). The feedback in these tasks consists of either being
given the correct answer to the question or being given feedback about the accuracy of
one's own response.

Confounding of Judgment Task on the Hindsight Bias.
It can be argued that situational (likelihood) judgments and metacognitive
(confidence) assessments involve fundamentally different cognitive processes during the
problem representation and judgment formation processes (Ash, 2009; Ash & Wiley,
2008; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). It seems then that a major part of the theoretical
confusion as to whether the hindsight effect is a unitary or non-unitary phenomenon
stems from researcher not differentiating between judgment tasks. Results that may seem
inconsistent or conflicting in the literature may be due to the feet that researchers are
assuming a unitary explanation for the hindsight bias across judgment tasks. However, if
we assume that these different types of judgment tasks involved different reconstruction
processes, then we would expect different variables and manipulations to have different
effects on hindsight bias.
Differences between situational judgments and metacognitive assessments have
already appeared in the problem solving and comprehension literatures. In regards to
situational judgments, much work has already been done in the area of how people
construct, integrate, store, and update narrative information and it has been proposed that
the formation of a mental problem representation relies on the same cognitive processes
as the comprehension of events, situations, or texts (Kintsch, 1988,1998; Trabasso &
Wiley, 2005). As narrative texts serve as the problem stimuli for situational judgments,
construction integration models of text representations therefore seem to be more than
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adequate in explaining how mental representations of situational judgments are formed.
Generally, narrative comprehension theories contend that new information is entered into
a representation and connected with preexisting information already in memory. The
integration of new information into memory updates the "accessibility" of information,
thus changing the connection strength between information units. New information is
proposed to be connected or integrated into an ongoing representation by either
"resonance" mechanisms (Kintsch, 1998; Myers & O'Brien, 1998) or through the
changes based on causal relationships (Langston & Trabasso, 1999; Langston, Trabasso,
& Magliano, 1998; Trabasso & Bartolone, 2003; Trabasso & Wiley, 2005; Trabasso &
van den Broek, 1985). Regardless of the mechanism, prior information that is connected
to the new information increases the relative accessibility of those connected information
units to a greater degree than information unit pairs that are not connected.
Unfortunately, less is known about how metacognitive assessment cues are
represented in memory. Van Overschede (2008) contends that most investigations into
metacognitive assessments focus on one's interpretation or assessment of the accessibility
of the metacognitive cues while neglecting the actually representational structure of the
cue influencing these assessments. He notes that the structure of the knowledge base of
the cue, which provides the foundation for true metacognitive decision, has "been
underemphasized in metacognitive research and theory" and that future research is
needed to compensate for this error (Van Overschelde, 2008, p. 65). However, both the
expectation and experience based adjustment mechanisms within the anchoring and
adjustment hindsight theories have been shown to successfully account for hindsight bias
effects in these types of judgments (Hoch & Loewenstein, 1989; Ofir & Mazursky, 1990;
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1997; Sanna & Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Stahlberg, 2003; Werth & Strack, 2003;
Werth, Strack, & Forster, 2002).

Judgment Task Differentiation
Ash and Wiley (2008) and Ash (2009) have proposed a non-unitary approach to
modeling the hindsight bias that differentiated between judgment tasks based on how
mental representations influence the judgment formation and reconstruction processes. In
Ash and Wiley (2008), they proposed that the judgment reconstruction processes
described by Anchor and Adjustment theories might provide a plausible explanation for
hindsight bias effects on metacognitive assessments because these judgments use the
types of metacognitive cues (i.e. domain self-efficacy or feeling of knowing) described in
the expectation and experience based adjustment models. They also proposed that the
judgment reconstruction processes described by Updating & Rejudging theories might
provide a plausible explanation for the hindsight bias for situational judgments used in
narrative text paradigms. They proposed that these judgment tasks require people to form
a mental representation of the novel situation described in the narrative text and that the
judgments depend on the information available in one's mental representation. In line
with their predictions, using multi-component mathematical and insight problems in a
within-subjects hindsight bias paradigm, they found different patterns of hindsight bias
on metacognitive judgments (people's confidence in their ability of solving a problem)
and situational judgments (people's assessment of the importance of the different
components of a problem) depending on the type of problem, availability of feedback,
and solution success.
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Furthermore, Ash (2009) found that sense making theories within the Updating
and Rejudging CR class best described hindsight results on situational judgments. Using
a narrative text paradigm, Ash investigated the influence of surprise (manipulated by the
congruency between pre-outcome information and outcome information) on the hindsight
bias of event-likelihood ratings (situational judgments). Results indicated that the
hindsight bias did not occur in situations where the given outcome was congruent with
the majority of outcome supporting information presented in the narrative. The hindsight
bias only occurred in situations where the initial representation was ambivalent to or
incongruent with the given outcome, supporting the idea that active sense-making
processes are involved in the process of updating the problem representation during
retrospective judgment making for situational judgment domains. Additionally, Nester
and Egloff (2009) also provided support that sense-making or causal reasoning processes
account for hindsight bias effects on event likelihood judgments. Nestler and Egloff
(2009) found that providing explainable outcomes to surprise trivia questions moderated
hindsight bias effects for outcome likelihood ratings (impressions of necessity/inevitable)
but not for metacognitive assessments (impressions of foreseeability). These empirical
findings therefore provide preliminary evidence that indicates that the hindsight bias in
metacognitive assessments can best be explained by an expectation based anchoring and
adjusting heuristic and the hindsight bias in situational judgment tasks can best be
explained by causal reasoning or sense-making processes (Ash & Wiley, 2008; Ash,
2009; Nester et al., 2008a, 2008b; Nestler & Egloff 2009).

Experiment: Likelihood and Confidence Judgments
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What is lacking in the hindsight bias literature is a direct empirical test
demonstrating the independence of outcome likelihood and confidence judgment tasks.
Therefore, the current experiment tested a non-unitary approach to modeling the
hindsight biased based on Ash and Wiley (2008) against a unitary approach. To
accomplish this, I used the text based scenario developed by Ash (2009). This scenario
was designed for testing differing predictions of outcome congruency on hindsight effects
within a case-study or narrative text paradigm. The scenario and research design allows
one to test competing models of hindsight bias in a single domain where the information
available to a participant at the points of prediction and retrospection can be controlled.
As noted by Ash (2009), one way in which CR theories differ is in the proposed
effect of expectation or the surprising nature of an outcome on the hindsight bias. To
manipulate surprise, participants were asked to read a story describing an upcoming
tennis match between two players. The story described the strengths and weaknesses of
each player. An equated version of the text was created that presented equal amounts of
evidence to support each players' victory. From this equated text, an outcome-supporting
version for each player was developed by removing pieces of evidence that supported the
other tennis player's victory. When these introductory texts are combined with the two
possible outcomes, it leads to three types of outcome conditions: Congruent (where the
outcome matched that supported by the story), Ambivalent (either outcome matched with
the equated story), and Incongruent (where the outcome was the opposite of that
supported by the story). In this paradigm, when preoutcome information (the introductory
text) is congruent with the outcome (who won the match), it is an expected or
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unsurprising outcome. However, when preoutcome information is incongruent with the
outcome, this is called an unexpected or surprising outcome.
For the procedure, participants first read the introductory story. Then, they were
asked to rate the likelihood of the two possible outcomes on a continuum anchored on
each player's victory. Then they read a passage describing who won and then rated how
surprising they found the outcome. Finally, participants returned to the lab a week later
and attempted to recall their original predictions. The hindsight bias in this paradigm
would be observed if retrospective judgments would be systematically biased toward the
given outcome.
Using this paradigm, based on the non-unitary approach of Ash and Wiley (2008)
and Ash (2009), a judgment type (metacognitive confidence assessment vs. situational
likelihood rating) by outcome congruency (incongruent, congruent) interaction on
hindsight results is predicted. Sense making theories are predicted to provide the most
plausible explanation of hindsight findings for situational judgments and the expectationbased adjustment model to provide the most plausible explanation for hindsight findings
on metacognitive judgments. Therefore, for situational judgment tasks, sense-making
theories predict the most hindsight bias after surprising outcomes, because surprising
situations will activate the sense-making processes leading to a biased, updated
representation that will be used during retrospective judgment making. For metacognitive
judgments, expectation based adjustment models predict that the most hindsight bias
should occur on expected outcomes because these outcomes will be the most likely to
elicit the "I would have known that!" feeling that leads to overly-adjusted retrospective
judgments.

20

However, a unitary approach to modeling hindsight findings predicts no judgment
type by outcome congruency interaction on hindsight results. In this unitary approach,
sense making theories predict the occurrence of the hindsight bias only in the incongruent
outcome condition regardless of the judgment task. In a similar fashion, expectation
based adjustment models predict the occurrence of the hindsight bias only in the
congruent outcome condition for both situational judgments and metacognitive
assessments.
In sum, if likelihood and confidence judgments are indeed separate tasks
governed by differing cognitive processes, the sense making theories would best predict
hindsight bias findings resulting from situational likelihood judgment tasks and
expectation-based adjustment models would best predict hindsight bias findings from
metacognitive confidence assessments. Patterns of the hindsight bias would therefore
differ according to which judgment task is completed. Metacognitive assessments would
show hindsight effects only in an outcome congruent condition while situational
judgments would show hindsight effects only in an outcome incongruent condition.
However, if these judgment tasks are not independent, then no differences in the pattern
of hindsight bias findings between judgment tasks will be observed, thus supporting
predictions based on a unitary explanation for modeling hindsight effects. Table 1
illustrates the judgment type by outcome congruency hindsight predictions for the unitary
model and non-unitary models.
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Table 1
Predictions
Judgment Tasks
Metacognitive
Situational
Judgment Tasks
Metacognitive
Metacognitive
Situational
Situational

Non-Unitary Theory
Expectation-based
Sense making
Unitary Theory
Expectation based
Sense making
Expectation based
Sense making

HB predictions
Incongrnent
NoHSB
HSB
Incongruent
NoHSB,
HB
NoHSB,
HB

HB predictions
Congruent
HSB
NoHSB
Congruent
HB
NoHSB
HB
NoHSB

Note. The Unitary versus Non-Unitary predictions of hindsight efifects by judgment type
and outcome congruency.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Participants
Based on the average hindsight bias effect sizes reported in meta-analyses
(Christensen-Szalanski & Willham, 1991; Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway & Posavac,
2004) and the Ash (2009) experiments, between 40 (Cohen's d = .4) and 68 (Cohen's d =
.3) participants were needed in each congruency experimental conditions (Congruent and
Incongruent outcome conditions) in order to test for the moderation effects of judgment
type by outcome congruency on hindsight effects proposed by the different hindsight bias
theories. Two hundred fifty four introductory psychology students from Old Dominion
University participated in both sessions of this study for course credit (72.4% women; M
age = 21.44 years, SD = 6.46 years; Range = 18-54 years; 95.7% native English
speakers). Table 2 illustrates the proposed and obtained sample size per condition.

Table 2
Condition N Sizes
Tennis Match
Congruent
Incongruent
Job Promotion
Congruent
Incongruent

Preoutcome
information
Krause supporting
Mitchell supporting
Krause supporting
Mitchell supporting

Outcome information

Proposed
N

Obtained
N

Krause wins
Mitchell wins
Mitchell wins
Krause wins

30
30
30
30

32
31
30
30

Keller supporting
Davidson supporting
Keller supporting
Davidson supporting

Kellar wins
Davidson wins
Davidson wins
Kellar wins

30
30
30
30

32
33
33
33

Note. Design of Preoutcome and Outcome Information Congruency Manipulation with
Sample Sizes by Text Scenario.
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Materials
Two narrative stories were used in this experiment, one utilized in Ash (2009)
which describes a tennis match and one I have developed and piloted that describes a job
promotion. Ash (2009) used a pre-outcome narrative text that described an upcoming
championship tennis match between two fictional players, Mark Krause and Nathan
Mitchell. The story was designed to equate the amount of causal information in the text
that supported either player's victory. Appendix A contains the tennis match text and
illustrates which sentences, if deleted, provide support for an outcome that favors either
Krause or Mitchell. Two outcome information texts were created for the story. These
texts were designed to inform the participant as to the outcome of the text, with either a
"Krause Wins" outcome or a "Mitchell Wins" outcome.
The narrative story I created utilizes a narrative text with the domain of a job
promotion as the subject matter of the story and predictions of who will get the
promotion as the judgment domain. This manipulation will serve to help show whether
the idea that patterns of the hindsight bias differ according to judgment tasks is a robust
explanation of the hindsight bias effect across differing domains. As in the tennis match
story, the job promotion story was designed to equate the amount of causal information in
the text that supported either businessman's successful promotion, either Jeffrey Keller or
Michael Davidson. Also, two outcome information texts were created for this story,
informing the participant as to either a "Keller got the promotion" outcome or a
"Davidson got the promotion" outcome. Appendix B contains the job promotion
narrative text.

Design and Procedure
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Participants were randomly assigned to either the tennis match or job promotion
story. For either story, participants were randomized to one of eight story orders to
control for order effects. An E-Prime application running on laboratory computers
presented all directions, experimental materials, and questions as well as collected all
participant responses.
The narrative protocol used in Ash (2009) was closely replicated for both stories;
differing in that participants were randomly assigned to either a pre-outcome
metacognitive assessment task condition or a pre-outcome event likelihood (situational)
judgment task condition. The experiment consisted of two sessions that took place
exactly 1 week apart. The first session involved two main phases: a practice phase and an
experimental phase. Participants were told that they are participating in a study on
reading comprehension in which they will be asked to read stories and answer opinion
questions about the stories. The practice phase involved a reading task, rating tutorial,
and rating tasks. Participants first read a practice story and then they read a short tutorial
which described the rating procedure. They then answered questions about the likelihood
of two possible outcomes using the same procedure as in the experimental phase. The
experimental phase occurred directly after the practice phase and involved the preoutcome information reading task, pre-outcome metacognitive confidence rating or event
likelihood rating, outcome information reading task, and post-outcome surprise rating.
For the experimental phase, participants were randomly assigned to a preoutcome scenario (i.e. a Krause supporting or Mitchell supporting text). Participants were
also randomly assigned to which outcome text they received (Krause Wins or Mitchell
Wins). The combination of the pre-outcome and outcome texts resulted in two
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information-outcome congruency conditions (Congruent and Incongruent). The preoutcome text and the outcome text were presented via a self-paced reading paradigm.
Each sentence of the text was presented on the screen one at a time with participants
advancing through the text by pressing the space bar. Directly after reading the preoutcome text, participants were asked to either make a metacognitive assessment or an
event likelihood rating of the two possible outcomes. Specifically, for the metacognitive
assessment, participants were asked "How confident are you in predicting who will win
the job promotion/tennis match? Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how
confident you are in your ability to predict who will win." Below the metacognitive
question, a confidence rating was flanked by anchors of "not at all confident" and "very
confident". For the event likelihood rating, participants were asked "Either Mark
Krause/Jeffrey Kellar won the match OR Michael Davidson/Nathan Mitchell won the
promotion/match. Use the scale below to indicate your opinion of how likely the two
outcomes are based on the story." Below the event likelihood question, a continuum that
is flanked on either side by "Kellar/Krause Wins" and "Davidson/Mitchell Wins" was
presented. For both the confidence and event likelihood rating, the continuum was
initially blank. However, after reading the question, when participants press the space bar
a marker appears at a random location somewhere in the middle third of the scale.
Participant then indicate their response by moving the marker on the scale between the
two possible outcomes. The continuum allows for 79 possible marker locations.
Participants are able to move the marker along the scale by pressing the 1 key to move
left or the 3 key to move right. Each press moves the marker one space on the scale.
Participants press the Enter key to indicate their final response. The program accepts a

26

response only if the marker moves at least once. This measure serves as the predictive
judgments used to test whether the information congruency manipulation affects
participants' outcome expectation and as the within-subjects comparison for hindsight
bias observations.
To assess post-outcome surprise, immediately after reading the outcome
information, participants were asked, "How surprising was it that [outcome]?" Depending
on the outcome condition, "[outcome]" is replaced by either "Jeffrey Kellar/Mark Krause
won the promotion/match" or "Michael Davidson/Nathan Mitchell won the
promotion/match." Participants then rated their surprise by using the same procedure as
the other ratings, differing in that for this measure the continuum is anchored by "Not at
all surprising" and "Very surprising". This measure serves as the surprise rating that is
used to test whether the information-outcome congruency manipulation affected
participants' subjective reaction to the outcome. This surprise rating concluded the
session 1 experimental phase. After completing this rating all participants were asked not
to discuss the text they read or the questions they were asked with anyone in the subject
pool (including other participants in their group) and were dismissed.
In the second session one week later, participants completed a post-outcome
memory-rating task, which asked them to attempt to recall their pre-outcome confidence
rating or likelihood rating. They were presented with the following directions: "Your task
is to attempt to remember your answer to each of the questions from last week's session.
To do this you will move the marker into the SAME position on the rating line as you put
it during last week's session. Remember your goal is to try to reproduce your original
ratings from last week's session. You will do this by moving a marker on a scale in the
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same manner as last week. Pressing the 1 KEY will move the marker to the LEFT.
Pressing the 3 KEY will move the marker to the RIGHT. When the marker is at the same
position as it was on the question asked last week, press ENTER to record your response.
Please try your best at remembering your rating from last week on each of the questions."
The participants, according to which judgment type condition they were randomly
assigned to in session 1, were then presented either the pre-outcome confidence rating
question or pre-outcome likelihood rating question. The post-outcome memory rating
served as the measure of the participants' retrospective judgments. Then, upon
completion of the memory ratings, participants were debriefed as to the purpose of the
study and reminded not to speak with anyone about the materials or questions appearing
in the study.
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CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Preoutcome Predictive Judgment Ratings
In order to test the effects of expectation on hindsight bias effects, the
manipulation of preoutcome information must affect participants' predictive judgments
of the given outcome. People should judge the given outcome, which is the outcome they
are about to receive, as most expected in the Congruent condition and least expected in
the Incongruent condition. For analysis, preoutcome predictive ratings were centered on
the middle value of the rating continuum (range = -39 to 39) and recoded in order for
positive scores to represent judgments in favor of the given outcome and negative scores
to represent judgments in favor of the alternative outcome. Then to investigate the effects
of the story bias manipulation on predictive judgments, I performed a 2 (judgment task:
metacognitive vs. situational) X 2 (outcome congruency: incongruent vs. congruent) X 2
(text: tennis match vs. job promotion) factorial ANOVA on mean predictive judgments.
Result indicate a significant difference between the congruent and incongruent groups,
F( 1, 246) = 76.87, p < .001, partial

= .238. Additionally, I performed planned one-

sample t tests against a population mean of zero which revealed that participants in the
Congruent condition favored the given outcome (M= 8.23, SD = 15.50), /(127) = 6.01, p
< .001, Cohen's d = 0.531; those in the Incongruent condition favored the alternative
outcome (A/= -9.52, SD = 17.30), /(125) = -6.17,< .001, Cohen's d= 0.550. These
analyses show that the information manipulation designed to bias the story toward the
different outcomes had a significant effect on participants' predictive judgments.
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A note should also be made that analyses also indicated a significant judgment
type X outcome congruency interaction, F( 1, 246) = 13.67,p < .001, partial

= .053.

However, simple effect comparisons of the judgment type X outcome congruency
interaction for predictive ratings indicated non cross-over interactions. For metacognitive
assessments, the simple effect test of outcome congruency indicated that predictive
ratings differ across congruency conditions, F( 1,246) = 12.95, p < .001, partial

=

.050. The same effect was found for situational judgments, F(1, 246) = 77.09, p < .001,
partial

= .239. In comparison to the congruency conditions for the metacognitive

assessments (Incongruent: M= -5.56, SD =14.50; Congruent: M=4.85, SD = 13.65), the
situational judgments had greater predictive ratings in both the Congruent condition (M =
11.71, SD = 16.60) and the Incongruent condition (M = -13.48, SD- 18.62). Non cross
over interactions, or quantitative interactions, occur when there is variation in the
magnitude, but not in the direction, of treatment effects among subsets (Gail & Simon,
1985). Therefore, the non cross-over interactions did not confound any manipulation
effect. Supporting this are the results which indicate that the outcome congruency
manipulation had a significant effect for all intended subsets.

Surprise Ratings
To test the design assumption that the manipulation of preoutcome information
also affected how surprising participants found the outcome information, I conducted a 2
(judgment task: metacognitive vs. situational) X 2 (outcome congruency: incongruent vs.
congruent) X 2 (text: tennis match vs. job promotion) factorial ANOVA on mean
postoutcome surprise ratings (possible range: 1 = not at all surprising to 79 = very
surprising). Results indicated a significant difference in surprise ratings between
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congruency groups, with Incongruent outcomes ( M = 46.48, S D = 20.25) being
significantly more surprising than Congruent outcomes (M= 13.03, SD = 12.75), F(1,
246) = 255.93,p < .001, partial

= .510.

This main effect was subsumed under a significant text X outcome congruency
interaction, F(l, 246) = 10.48, p = .001, partial

= .041, as well as a significant

judgment task X outcome congruency interaction, F(1,246) = 5.00, p = .026, partial

=

.020. However, simple effect comparisons of the interactions indicated significant non
cross-over interactions that did not confound any manipulation effect. For the tennis
match the simple effect test of outcome congruency indicated that surprise ratings differ
across congruency conditions, F(l, 246) = 191.06, p < .001, partial

= .437. The same

effect was found for the job promotion text, F(1, 246) = 78.91 ,p <.001, partial

= .243.

Therefore, in comparison to the congruency conditions in the tennis match, the job
promotion text had a smaller surprise rating for the Congruent condition and a larger
surprise rating in the Incongruent condition. For metacognitive assessments, the simple
effect test of outcome congruency indicated that surprise ratings differ across congruency
conditions, F(l, 246) = 167.55, p < .001, partial

= .405. The same effect was found for

situational judgments, F(l, 246) = 93.95,/? < .001, partial

= .276. Therefore, in

comparison to the congruency conditions for the metacognitive assessments, the
situational judgments had a larger surprise rating for the Congruent condition and a
smaller surprise rating in the Incongruent condition. In summary, these analyses
demonstrate that the outcome congruency manipulation had a significant effect on
participants1 subjective (surprise) reactions to the outcome information. See Figure 1 for
mean surprise ratings by text, judgment task, and outcome congruency condition.
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Figure 1. Mean surprise ratings as a function of text, judgment task, and outcome
congruency condition. Error bars represent standard error of each mean.

Hindsight Bias
In order to investigate the effects of judgment task and outcome congruency on
hindsight effects, a 2 (judgment: predictive vs. retrospective judgment) X 2 (judgment
task: metacognitive vs. situational) X 2 (outcome congruency: incongruent vs. congruent)
X 2 (text: tennis match vs. job promotion) split-plot ANOVA was conducted on judgment
ratings. Driven by the non cross-over interaction of the predictive ratings that were
described earlier, results revealed a significant text X outcome congruency interaction for
the averaged judgment ratings, F(1, 246) = 5.15,p = .024, partial

= .021. Again,
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simple effect tests indicated this interaction to be a non cross-over interaction. Figure 2
displays the hindsight bias patterns for the tennis match and Figure 3 displays the
hindsight bias patterns for the job promotion text.
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Figure 2. Hindsight bias results: mean predictive and retrospective judgments as a
function of judgment task, preoutcome, and outcome congruency condition for tennis
match text. Error bars represent standard error of each mean.
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Figure 3. Hindsight bias results: mean predictive and retrospective judgments as a
function of judgment task, preoutcome, and outcome congruency condition for job
promotion text. Error bars represent standard error of each mean.

More importantly, results revealed a main effect of judgment which demonstrated
the traditional hindsight bias effect, F(l, 246) = 7.23,p = .008, Cohen's d= -0.241.
Participants' retrospective judgments were more in favor of the given outcome (M =3.19,
SD = 21.27) than their predictive judgments (M= -0.57, SD - 18.64). However, where
the theories differ in their hindsight bias predictions is in the judgment (predictive vs.
retrospective) X judgment task (metacognitive vs. situational) X outcome congruency
(incongruent vs. congruent) interaction (See Table 2). The judgment X judgment task X
outcome congruency interaction was significant, F(l, 246) = 14.35, p < .001, partial

=

.055.
Planned follow up comparisons were conducted to examine judgment X outcome
congruency interactions separately for the metacognitive and situational judgments. For
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metacognitive judgments, the judgment X outcome congruency interaction was
significant, F(1,246) = 10.40, p = .001, partial

= .040 with further comparisons

between congruency conditions providing evidence for the hindsight bias effect in the
Congruent condition, F( 1, 246) = 9.55, p = .002, Cohen's d = .492 but not in the
Incongruent condition, F(l, 246) = 2.20,p = .139, Cohen's d = .254. The opposite
hindsight bias pattern was revealed within the situational judgment task. For situational
judgments, the judgment X outcome congruency interaction was also significant, F( 1,
246) = 4.55, p = .033, partial

=.018, with further comparisons between congruency

conditions providing evidence for the hindsight bias effect in the Incongruent condition,
F(l, 246) = 11.64, p < .001, Cohen's d= .493 but not in the Congruent condition, F(l,
246) = 0.15,p = .703, Cohen's d= .062.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
Using a within-subjects, narrative text paradigm, the current experiment
investigated if confidence ratings and outcome likelihood judgments are susceptible to
unique patterns of hindsight bias. Based on the non-unitary approach of Ash and Wiley
(2008) and Ash (2009), a predicted judgment type by outcome congruency interaction on
hindsight bias effects was tested. This interaction prediction specified that unexpected
outcome information would produce hindsight bias effects for situational (outcome
likelihood) judgments and expected outcome information would produce hindsight bias
effects for metacognitive (confidence) judgments. Findings confirmed this predicted
interaction with situational and metacognitive judgments producing divergent patterns of
hindsight bias; suggesting these tasks to be independent and governed by differing
cognitive processes.
The proposed non-unitary approach models situational judgments and
metacognitive assessments as utilizing different problem representations and
restructuring cues, which activate different judgment formation processes. Due to these
task and processing differences, the theories and models required to explain hindsight
bias patterns must be unique to each judgment task. The results of this experiment are
consistent with the proposed non-unitary hindsight bias approach. For the situational
judgment task, sense-making theories accurately predicted the hindsight bias to occur
after unexpected outcomes. Sense-making theories attribute the occurrence of the bias to
the unexpected outcome (i.e. a surprising situation) activating sense-making processes
that led to a biased, updated representation being used during retrospective judgment
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making. For the metacognitive assessment task, expectation based adjustment models
accurately predicted the hindsight bias to occur after expected outcomes. Expectation
based adjustment models attribute the bias to the expected outcome eliciting an "I would
have known that!" feeling which led to an overconfident, over-adjusted, retrospective
judgment.
This experiment provides a direct empirical test of the independence of hindsight
bias patterns between situational (outcome likelihood) and metacognitive (confidence)
judgments; replicating, complementing, and extending previous hindsight research that
has suggested these tasks to have unique qualities (Ash & Wiley, 2008; Ash, 2009; Blank
et al., 2008; Nestler & Egloff, 2009). For example, in addition to finding empirical
support for the non-unitary hindsight predictions of Ash and Wiley (2008) and Ash
(2009), this experiment expanded the narrative text stimuli used in Ash (2009) to include
a job promotion story. This addition shows the generalizability of the patterns of
hindsight effects of the judgment tasks across different story content domains. This
experiment also replicates and extends the hindsight findings in Nestler and Egloff (2009)
while utilizing a different design and materials. In Nestler and Egloff (2009) a betweensubjects, trivia question paradigm produced findings that confirmed predictions of 1)
sense-making or causal modeling theories to accurately account for hindsight patterns for
the surprising outcome likelihood ratings and 2) outcome likelihood ratings and
metacognitive assessments to display different hindsight patterns. By replicating these
findings, the methodology used in this experiment provided evidence to extend the
generalizability of these findings to a within-subjects, narrative scenario paradigm.
Furthermore, additional design elements in this experiment allowed for more
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comprehensive empirical examinations of the cognitive processes responsible for the
differing hindsight patterns. For one, the manipulation of story outcomes allowed for the
analysis of both expected (unsurprising) and unexpected (surprising) outcomes. This
added manipulation allowed for the predictions of the "I would have known that!"
hindsight bias theories to be tested in this experiment. These predictions were unable to
be tested in Nester and EglofF(2009) as they only utilized surprising outcomes. Secondly,
surprise was experimentally manipulated in this experiment through random assignment
to outcome congruency conditions. Nestler and EglofF (2009) did not experimentally
manipulate the inducement of surprise, but alternatively relied on the sample's prior
knowledge of the plausibility of trivia questions to elicit surprise. Not experimentally
manipulating surprise potentially weakens the accuracy of their proposed generalized
causal inference of the relationship between surprising events and hindsight effects
(Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
In addition to complementing previous hindsight research, this study also
provides unique empirical and theoretical contributions. While other non-unitary theories
have attempted to account for the different "hindsight experiences", the non-unitary
approach tested in this experiment is unique in that it is the only approach to propose a
model of the hindsight bias that differentiates between judgment tasks according to how
mental representations influence the judgment formation and reconstruction processes.
The results of this experiment provide strong support for the proposition that some of the
opposing predictions and conflicting findings in the hindsight bias literature may be a
symptom of researchers not separating judgment tasks according to the cognitive
processes that are unique to each task.
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Based on the findings of the current investigation, modifications to current CR
approaches of modeling hindsight bias effects are necessary. While previous CR models
have focused their attention on modeling the judgment formation mechanisms,
improvements can be achieved if they 1) account for the mental representation of the
judgment task and 2) differentiate between the judgment tasks (and the resulting
hindsight effects) the theory intends to model. The proposed non-unitary approach
investigated here has attempted to integrate these improvements by incorporating the
conceptualizations that 1) different judgment tasks rely on different mental
representations, 2) mental representations are updated in different ways using different
cues, and 3) people formulate retrospective judgments differently according to the
representation and updating processes.
Despite providing strong evidence for this alternative non-unitary approach to
modeling hindsight bias effects, limitations are present. For one, this is only one
experiment. Multiple replications as well as greater theoretical expansions are needed to
fully conceptualized and validate this approach. Additionally, researchers have noted that
the procedural differences between within-subjects/memory design and betweensubjects/hypothetical design paradigms may lead to qualitatively different hindsight
effects (Hertwig, Gigerenzer, & Hoflrage, 1997; Pohl, 2007). In a memory design,
participants first make predictive judgments and then are asked to recall those judgments
after they receive outcome information. Predictive and retrospective judgments are
compared within-subjects to investigate evidence of the hindsight bias effect. In a
hypothetical design, participants are fist given outcome information and then are asked to
ignore the outcome and make the predictive judgment as they would have made had they
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not learned the outcome. In this design, retrospective judgments are compared betweensubjects with a group that had made a predictive judgment without outcome information.
As mentioned earlier, while the within-subjects design of this experiment and the
between subjects design of Nestler and Egloss (2009) produced similar hindsight patterns
for surprising outcome likelihood judgments, future research needs to examine if the
hindsight patterns of the confidence ratings as well as the unsurprising outcome
likelihood judgments demonstrated in this experiment generalize to a between subjects
design.
The results from this investigation support a non-unitary approach to
understanding and investigating the hindsight bias phenomenon that integrates ideas
across different literatures and can help explain some of the inconsistencies and
anomalies in the hindsight bias literature. These findings can be used to build upon the
great theoretical advancements in the field to date and offer potentially fruitful research
directions for the future. For example, this non-unitary approach is able to generate
unique, testable predictions involving the representational and judgment formation
differences between judgment tasks. For instance, the Motivated Sense-Making model
developed by Pezzo et al. (2007) would predict no hindsight bias in conditions of high
self-relevance conditions and hindsight bias in low self-relevance conditions, regardless
of judgment type. However, this non-unitary approach would predict different patterns of
hindsight bias on situational and metacognitive judgments regardless of the self-relevance
of the judgment.
I believe that many of the different hindsight bias theories that have been
proposed offer important insights into the causes of hindsight bias effects specifically,
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and the processes by which people represent information and formulate judgments in
general. Based on this proposed non-unitary approach, theories of hindsight bias that
have previously been viewed as competing accounts of a single psychological
phenomenon may actually prove to be complimentary explanations of retrospective
judgment effects in qualitatively different domains. Based on the current investigation,
sense-making theories and expectation based adjustment theories may be just two sides of
the same coin; the former accounting for hindsight bias effects on situational judgments
and the latter accounting for hindsight bias effects on metacognitive assessments.
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APPENDIX A
THE CHAMPIONSHIP TENNIS MATCH
Preoutcome information text: With all sentences included, this is the Equated Support
version. With boldfaced sentences removed, it becomes the Krause Supporting version,
and with underlined sentences removed, it becomes the Mitchell Supporting version. The
story is divided into three parts. Within each part, the sentences with Krause or Mitchell
as the subject were counterbalanced to control for order effects. Sentence labels: S =
setting; K = Krause as subject;
M = Mitchell as subject; KO = Krause outcome; MO = Mitchell outcome. Numbering
reflects the proposed matched causal antecedence for each outcome.

Part 1
51. The final tennis match of the Australian open pitted two very noteworthy players
against each other.
K1. The player who was starting on the north side of the court was Mark Krause from
Germany.
K2. Krause was a 39-year-old, well-respected veteran tennis player.
K3. That year, Krause had staged the comeback of the decade.
K4. In his younger years he was consistently a top ranked world champion.
K5. Krause was an experienced player who had trained hard to get back at the top of his
game.
K6. His hard training had helped him move up to 5th in the international rankings.
K7. However, at his age, Krause was thought by many critics to be well past his
prime.
Ml. The player who was starting out on the south side of the court was Nathan Mitchell
of the United Kingdom.
M2. Mitchell was a 19-year-old tennis prodigy.
M3. That year, Mitchell had been considered one of the most promising new players.
M4. At the previous year's Olympics, he had earned a gold medal in the singles
competition.
M5. Mitchell was an ambitious young player who was a natural athlete.
M6. This athletic ability had led him to be ranked 6th internationally.
M7. However, many critics have pointed out that, at his age, he still lacked the
experience of many of the other top ranked plavers.
Part 2
52. Both players had different strengths and weaknesses.
K8. Krause was known for his rocket of a first serve.
K9. He was nicknamed "Ace." because he had been known to complete entire matches
without losing a single point on his serve.
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KIO. Krause had developed a distinct patient style of play, where he focused on returning
all volleys and waited for the opponent to make the mistake.
Kll. However, this patient style sometimes worked against him, because the long
matches often ended up wearing him out earlier than his younger opponents.
M8. Mitchell had been praised for his amazing two-handed backhand.
M9. His fast and accurate backhand rifled cross-court shots that even his quickest
opponents had trouble returning.
M10. Mitchell was known for his aggressive style, where he would often move up to the
net and quickly return each volley at high speeds and sharp angles.
M i l . However, in past matches his tendency to move toward the net too early had left
him unprepared for the strategic lobs and baseline shots of his more experienced
opponents.
Part 3
53. The wind was calm on the day of the match.
K12. Experts predicted the lack of wind would be a definite advantage for Krause.
because there would be nothing to disrupt his legendary serves to the younger Mitchell.
54. The weather on the day of the match was a balmy 93 degrees.
M12. Experts predicted that the hot weather would be a definite advantage for
Mitchell, because the heat would surely have a greater detrimental effect on the
older Krause.
55. The match was about to begin and a hush fell over the crowd.
56. Tennis fens around the world tuned in to see who was going to win this important
match.
Outcome Krause
501. The championship match of the Australian Open did not disappoint the fans.
502. The match pitted two formidable competitors against each other.
503. However, in the end there could only be one champion.
K04. At the end of the match, Mark Krause from Germany proved victorious.
K05. Krause defeated his opponent, Nathan Mitchell of Great Britain, in a decisive
victory.
K06. Krause's fens cheered wildly as he accepted his trophy as the Champion of the
Australian Open.
Outcome Mitchell
501. The championship match of the Australian Open did not disappoint the fans.
502. The match pitted two formidable competitors against each other.
503. However, in the end there could only be one champion.
M04. At the end of the match, Nathan Mitchell from Great Britain proved victorious.
M05. Mitchell defeated his opponent, Mark Krause of Germany, in a decisive victory.
M06. Mitchell's fens cheered wildly as he accepted his trophy as the Champion of the
Australian Open.
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APPENDIX B
THE JOB PROMOTION
Preoutcome information text: With all sentences included, this is the Equated Support
version. With boldfaced sentences removed, it becomes the Kellar Supporting version,
and with underlined sentences removed, it becomes the Davidson Supporting version.
The story is divided into three parts. Within each part, the sentences with Kellar or
Davidson as the subject were counterbalanced to control for order effects. Sentence
labels: S = setting; K = Kellar as subject;
D = Davidson as subject; KO = Kellar outcome; DO = Davidson outcome. Numbering
reflects the proposed matched causal antecedence for each outcome.

Part 1
51. The final round of interviews for a job promotion pitted two very noteworthy
businessmen against each other.
K l . The businessman who was scheduled for the morning interview was Jeffrey Kellar.
K2. Kellar was a 64-year-old, well-respected businessman.
K3. That year, Kellar had accomplished a marked increase in his sales profits compared
to previous years.
K4. In his younger years he was consistently a top ranked salesman.
K5. Kellar was a savvy businessman who had worked hard to get back at the top of his
game.
K6. His hard work had helped him move up the ranks in his company's sales division.
K7. However, at his age, Kellar was thought by many senior executives to be well
past his prime.
D l . The businessman who was scheduled for the afternoon interview was Michael
Davidson.
D2. Davidson was a 22-year-old business prodigy.
D3. That year, Davidson had been considered one of the most promising new associates.
D4. During the previous year, he had earned his company's top award for
exemplary job performance.
D5. Davidson was an ambitious young businessman who was a natural born salesman.
D6. This ability had led him to be ranked by his supervisors as a top sales prospect.
D7. However, many critics have pointed out that, at his age, he still lacked the experience
of many of the older top ranked salesmen.
Part 2
52. Both businessmen had different strengths and weaknesses.
K8. Kellar was known for his highly detailed sales pitch.
K9. He was nicknamed "Old FaithfiiL" because he had never lost a single customer to a
rival company.
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K10. Kellar had developed a distinct selling style, where he impressed his customers with
his product knowledge.
Kll. However, this selling style sometimes worked against him, because his
customers were sometimes bored with his overly time consuming conversations.
D8. Davidson had been praised for his amazing knack at quickly closing a business
deal.
D9. His fast and deliberate sale pitch consistently hit the mark, setting him apart
from his less successful colleagues.
D10. Davidson was known for his aggressive business style; where he would often move
on a sales deal quickly, preventing competing salesmen from presenting a counter offer.
D11. However, in the past few business deals his tendency to close the deal too quickly
had lead to poor customer satisfaction ratines.
Part 3
53. The first part of the interview consisted of a mock sales presentation to the
company's executive board to illustrate the candidates' product knowledge.
K12. Colleagues predicted the presentation would he a definite advantage for Kellar.
because of his extensive product knowledge.
54. The second part of the interview consisted of brief one-on-one interviews with
specific executive board members.
D12. Colleagues predicted that the brief interviews would be a definite advantage
for Davidson, because the short time limit would surely have a greater detrimental
effect on the overly wordy Kellar.
55. The interview was about to begin.
56. Colleagues from around the office gossiped as to who would get the promotion.
Outcome Kellar
501. The job promotion did not disappoint the employees.
502. The interview pitted two formidable candidates against each other.
503. However, in the end only one applicant could get the promotion.
K04. At the end of the interview day, Jeffrey Kellar got the promotion.
K05. Kellar was selected over his competition, Michael Davidson, in a unanimous
decision.
K06. Kellar's colleagues congratulated him as he graciously accepted his new
promotion.
Outcome Davidson
501. The job promotion did not disappoint the employees.
502. The interview pitted two formidable candidates against each other.
503. However, in the end only one applicant could get the promotion.
D04. At the end of the interview day, Michael Davidson got the promotion.
DO5. Davidson was selected over his competition, Jeffrey Kellar, in a unanimous
decision.

D06. Davidson's colleagues congratulated him as he graciously accepted his
promotion.
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